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Abstract
In this work, we address the question of generating understandable narratives using a cognitive
approach. The requirements of cognitive plausibility are presented. Then an abduction-based
cognitive model of the human deliberative reasoning ability is presented. We believe that imple-
menting such a procedure in a narrative context to generate plans would increase the chances
that the characters will be perceived as believable. Our suggestion is that the use of a deliberative
reasoning procedure can be used as a basis of several strategies to generate interesting stories.
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1 Introduction
Throughout their lifetime, humans are surrounded by narratives. A large amount of time
is devoted to the production of narratives [19, 13]. Many psychologists and AI researchers
suggest that narratives are used to make sense of the world, to order events and assimilate
them. This narrative intelligence is of major importance in the cognitive processes employed
across many contexts including entertainment [10], advertising, remembering or learning [8].
The classical problem addressed in the context of narrative generation is the fabula
generation, i.e. the generation of a temporally ordered sequence of events from the time
the story begins to the time the story ends [1]. The process of generating a narrative meets
some requirements to form acceptable narratives. One of them is to produce a sequence of
events that is understandable by the audience. Events should respect the causal rules of the
(possibly imaginary) world and the audience must be able to infer the characters’ intentions
during the course of the narration [2, 7].
In this work, we address the question of generating stories using a cognitive approach.
Especially, we are interested in investigating how authors create understandable stories with
believable characters. To do so, we will argue in favor of a cognitive model of deliberative
reasoning to generate stories.
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2 A cognitive approach to narrative planning
Computer-based story generation has been the subject of intense study in Artificial Intelligence
during the last century. The present work addresses the question of generating stories using
a cognitive approach. Especially, we address the question of generating plans, i.e. temporally
ordered sequences of actions or events.
Generating plans not only consists in choosing actions that respect the causal rules of
the world but also make the characters of the story appear believable. Characters’ actions
should not negatively impact the audience’s suspension of disbelief [2]. As Riedl and Young
(2005) put it: ‘one important aspect of character believability is character intentionality [i.e.]
the way in which the choice of actions and behaviors that a character makes appears natural
(and possibly rational) to external observers.’
According to classical models, someone who acts intentionally must have a desire (for an
outcome) and appropriate beliefs about how her action would lead to that outcome [5]. Malle
and Knobe (1997) have identified five necessary components to recognize the intentionality
of an acting agent: the desire for an outcome, the beliefs that the action would lead to this
outcome, the intention to perform the action, the awareness of the act while performing
it, and a sufficient degree of skill to perform the action reliably. In the field of automatic
narrative generation, it has been shown that the characters’ behavior must be perceived as
goal-oriented to make them appear as believable [17]. However, not all goal-oriented systems
meet the conditions of cognitive plausibility.
In the field of automatic story generation, there have been many attempts to generate
stories using script-based models [6]. These models, however, do not constitute as such a
cognitive approach. Humans use scripted plans to perform a large variety of tasks in daily
life, like drinking water or going to the bakery. However, a story generation system should
be able to modify scripts on the fly and, in the absence of appropriate scripts, to design a
new plan using knowledge about the world (e.g. states and rules).
It has been previously mentioned that goal-oriented systems are considered as essential
to make characters appear as believable. However, from a cognitive point of view, we do
not suppose that humans permanently hold in mind a (potentially unlimited) set of goals
that have to be fulfilled. A cognitively plausible model of plan generation at the agent’s level
should rather generate plans, not from some list of pre-existing goals, but on the fly, based
on conflicting elements in the characters’ internal knowledge and desires.
Another requirement for a cognitive model of planning is that it should not have access
to an external oracle that would provide pieces of information about the truth value of some
propositions. Plans are designed by the characters, from their own point of view, using only
their own internal knowledge and preferences.
Cognitive models of planning have to realize a sequential computation of the plans. Many
studies in psychology suggest that humans engage in something akin to partial-order planning
[15]. Especially, partial-order planning systems construct plans by manipulating partial
plans and revoking (if necessary) only parts of the global plan. Humans seems to exhibit
performances that are close to those of partial-order planners in terms of calculation time or
number of operations.
Lastly, a cognitive model of planning is not expected to generate an optimal plan that
would be best evaluated (depending on various objectives). It is expected to generate plans
that are merely acceptable.
In the next section, we present an abduction-based model of deliberative reasoning: the
Conflict-Abduction-Negation (CAN) procedure [3]. We show that this model may be used
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as a cognitively plausible model for the generation of plans at the character level. We also
indicate how it can serve as basis for several strategies to elicit interest in the audience.
3 The CAN-procedure, an argumentative model for narrative
generation
The CAN-procedure [3] is based on the conflict resolution via abduction. It has been
shown that abduction is central to human intelligence [9], especially in problem solving and
diagnosis reasoning contexts [11]. In the sense close to Peirce’s definition, abduction consists
in generating an hypothesis that explains an observation. Abduction also plays a major role
in narratives, both for characters and audience [4]. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987) explain
how readers of a narrative feel emotions as abductions. Abduction is also a way to avoid
emotional or narrative inconsistencies, and it is useful to avoid characters’ goals that would
appear as unmotivated.
The CAN-procedure is not goal-oriented, but problem-oriented: goals are generated
on the fly from cognitive conflicts when these conflicts are detected. The output of the
CAN-procedure, as it can be observed in actions and justifications, may lead observers to
perceive behaviour as goal-oriented, ignoring how "goals" have been generated. To understand
the notion of cognitive conflict, we have to introduce the notion of ’evaluation’ of a situation.
In real life, as in the storyworld, situations are not true or false but believed or not
believed. Some situations are desired and some others are not desired. We found that for
plan generation purposes, it is useful to merge beliefs and desires in a single evaluation.
Situations that one wants to avoid or that one does not believe will receive a negative
evaluation. Situations that are desired or believed will receive a positive evaluation. The
intensity of these evaluations depends on the level of desire or confidence. A situation may
receive several evaluations, it may be both believed and desired at the same time. Such a
case is considered as not conflicting. If the situation is believed but not desired, then the
situation is ’not comfortable’ and there is a cognitive conflict.
A cognitive conflict is detected whenever a given proposition is assigned two opposite
evaluations. For example, imagine that John, an adventurer, is looking for a treasure. Owning
the treasure is positively evaluated. However, the same fact is negatively evaluated as well,
since he knows the fact is false. The role of the deliberative reasoning procedure is to diminish
the intensity of evaluation conflicts. The procedure is described below:
Algorithm 1 The Conflict-Abduction-Negation Procedure
Step 1) A conflict has been detected, i.e. a situation s receives two opposite evaluations
v1 < 0 < v2. The conflict-solving procedure is launched.
Step 2) The procedure performs abduction from s, looking for a "weak" cause that would
make the conflict less intense. If the evaluation of the cause is smaller than −v1, the
conflict is moved to the cause.
Step 3) If the abduction phase fails, v2 is replaced by −v1. Then the whole procedure starts
anew from the negation of s (which is conflicting as well).
Step 4) If no solution to the conflict has been found, either one evaluation is revised or the
system exits without solution.
This procedure meets the conditions of cognitive plausibility previously described. Goals
are generated on the fly when undesired facts are negated. Plans are calculated using the
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internal evaluations of the planning individual. Moreover, the CAN-procedure is something
akin partial-order planning systems. Plans are only partially re-computed when inconsistencies
are detected. Consider the following example:
John wants the treasure, but didn’t get it (conflict). John needs to go in the castle
(abduction). The castle can be reach by going over the bridge (abduction) . . .
1) . . . [The bridge is not broken] John decides to go over the bridge to reach the castle and
then get the treasure (plan).
2) . . . [The bridge is broken] John cannot change it (abduction, negation). John cannot use
the bridge (failure). The castle can be reached through a longer path (abduction). John
decides to use the longer path to reach the castle and then get the treasure (plan).
The Conflict-Abduction-Negation procedure can be used recursively. It means that, if
the plan calculated by a character does not terminate as anticipated for whatever reason, the
character may launch the procedure anew to solve the remaining conflicts. Plans may fail
for a variety of reasons. At some point during the execution, a character may realize that
her knowledge about the world is erroneous, which means that one ore more propositions
have received a wrong evaluation. An action which was previously considered possible can
no longer be performed. A character may also realize that one or more consequences of her
actions were not correctly anticipated. Either her knowledge about the world is incomplete
or the consequences were just probable. Yet another possibility is the intervention of other
agents that may thwart the plan (including the storyworld considered as an “agent” controlled
by the author). The recursivity of the CAN procedure offers simple strategies to create
situations that are surprising from a character’s point of view. One strategy may be the
following one: the audience is informed about a character’s plan but this plan is thwarted by
the occurrence of some event and both the character and the audience may be surprised.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built an argument for the use of a model of deliberative reasoning in
the context of story generation. Our suggestion is that it may serve as basis for a minimalist
model of narrative generation.
In this article, the CAN-procedure is mainly used at the character level. With a model of
the audience, we believe that it can also be used at the audience level. At the character level,
the CAN-procedure may be used to compute plans characters intend to achieve. It may also
be used to anticipate what an audience will imagine, depending on the information provided.
The model needs to be associated with a formal model of narrative interest. In previous
works, we addressed this question and we introduced a model of narrative interest: Simplicity
Theory [18]. We intend to use this model based on the notion of unexpectedness in the
CAN-procedure to evaluate the situations in the storyworld and locally control the level of
interest during the course of the story.
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